| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10027 |
| DP10027 Dynamic Entry in Vertically Differentiated Markets | |
| Raphael Auer; Philip Sauré | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-06-15 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model of vertical innovation in which firms incur a market entry cost and choose a unique level of quality. Once established, firms compete for market shares, selling to consumers with heterogeneous tastes for quality. The equilibrium of the pricing game exists and is unique within our setup. Exogenous productivity growth induces firms to enter the market sequentially at the top end of the quality spectrum. A central feature of the model is that optimization problems of consecutive entrants are self-similar so that new firms enter in constant time-intervals and choose qualities that are a constant fraction higher than incumbent qualities. The asymmetries of quality choice, which inevitably arise because the quality spectrum has top and a bottom, is thus overcome by sequential entry. Our main contribution lies in handling these asymmetries. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Vertical differentiation Non-homogenous preferences Natural monopoly Endogenous growth Quality ladders Product quality |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10027 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538859 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Raphael Auer,Philip Sauré. DP10027 Dynamic Entry in Vertically Differentiated Markets. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Raphael Auer]的文章 |
| [Philip Sauré]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Raphael Auer]的文章 |
| [Philip Sauré]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Raphael Auer]的文章 |
| [Philip Sauré]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
