| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10036 |
| DP10036 Competitive Screening under Heterogeneous Information | |
| Renato Gomes; Lucas Maestri; Daniel Garrett | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-06-22 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study competition in price-quality menus when consumers privately know their valuation for quality (type), and are heterogeneously informed about the offers available in the market. While firms are ex-ante identical, the menus offered in equilibrium are ordered so that more generous menus leave more surplus uniformly over types. More generous menus provide quality more efficiently, serve a larger range of consumers, and generate a greater fraction of profits from sales of low-quality goods. By varying the mass of competing firms, or the level of informational frictions, we span the entire spectrum of competitive intensity, from perfect competition to monopoly. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Adverse selection Competition Heterogeneous information Price discrimination Screening |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10036 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538868 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Renato Gomes,Lucas Maestri,Daniel Garrett. DP10036 Competitive Screening under Heterogeneous Information. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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