| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10052 |
| DP10052 Endogenous Contractual Externalities | |
| Kathy Yuan; Emre Ozdenoren | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-07-06 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study ffort and risk-taking behaviour in an economy with a continuum of principal-agent pairs where each agent exerts costly hidden effort. When the industry productivity is uncertain, agents have motivations to match the industry average effort, which results in contractual externalities. Contractual externalities have welfare changing effects when the information friction is correlated and the industry risk is not revealed. This is because principals do not internalize the impact of their choice on other principals' endogenous industry risk exposure. Relative to the second best, if the expected productivity is high, risk-averse principals over-incentivise their own agents, triggering a rat race in effort exertion, resulting in over-investment in effort and excessive exposure to industry risks relative to the second best. The opposite occurs when the expected productivity is low. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contractual externalities Relative and absolute performance contracts Boom-bust effort exertion Risk taking |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10052 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538884 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kathy Yuan,Emre Ozdenoren. DP10052 Endogenous Contractual Externalities. 2014. |
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