G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10054
DP10054 The Effect of Competition on Managers? Compensation: Evidence From a Quasi-natural Experiment
L. Alan Winters; Ana Fernandes; Priscila Ferreira
发表日期2014-07-06
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要This paper studies the effect of competition on executive compensation. We estimate the effect of increased product market competition on the performance-pay sensitivity of CEOs, and contrast it with the effect for department managers and other workers in the corporation. We use a recent reform that simplified firm entry regulation in Portugal as a quasi-natural experiment. The empirical strategy exploits the staggered implementation of the reform across municipalities. Using linked employer-employee data for the universe of workers and firms, we show that increased product market competition, following the reform, decreased the sensitivity of pay to performance of CEOs, with no significant effects found for other managers or workers. These findings are consistent with existing theoretical results in a principal-agent framework that a fall in entry costs leads to weaker managerial incentives.
主题International Trade and Regional Economics
关键词Entry deregulation Product market competition Executive compensation Performance-related pay
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10054
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538886
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
L. Alan Winters,Ana Fernandes,Priscila Ferreira. DP10054 The Effect of Competition on Managers? Compensation: Evidence From a Quasi-natural Experiment. 2014.
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