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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP10054 |
DP10054 The Effect of Competition on Managers? Compensation: Evidence From a Quasi-natural Experiment | |
L. Alan Winters; Ana Fernandes; Priscila Ferreira | |
发表日期 | 2014-07-06 |
出版年 | 2014 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper studies the effect of competition on executive compensation. We estimate the effect of increased product market competition on the performance-pay sensitivity of CEOs, and contrast it with the effect for department managers and other workers in the corporation. We use a recent reform that simplified firm entry regulation in Portugal as a quasi-natural experiment. The empirical strategy exploits the staggered implementation of the reform across municipalities. Using linked employer-employee data for the universe of workers and firms, we show that increased product market competition, following the reform, decreased the sensitivity of pay to performance of CEOs, with no significant effects found for other managers or workers. These findings are consistent with existing theoretical results in a principal-agent framework that a fall in entry costs leads to weaker managerial incentives. |
主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
关键词 | Entry deregulation Product market competition Executive compensation Performance-related pay |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10054 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538886 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | L. Alan Winters,Ana Fernandes,Priscila Ferreira. DP10054 The Effect of Competition on Managers? Compensation: Evidence From a Quasi-natural Experiment. 2014. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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