全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP10054 The Effect of Competition on Managers? Compensation: Evidence From a Quasi-natural Experiment

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP10054
	DP10054 The Effect of Competition on Managers? Compensation: Evidence From a Quasi-natural Experiment
	L. Alan Winters; Ana Fernandes; Priscila Ferreira
发表日期	2014-07-06
出版年	2014
语种	英语
摘要	This paper studies the effect of competition on executive compensation. We estimate the effect of increased product market competition on the performance-pay sensitivity of CEOs, and contrast it with the effect for department managers and other workers in the corporation. We use a recent reform that simplified firm entry regulation in Portugal as a quasi-natural experiment. The empirical strategy exploits the staggered implementation of the reform across municipalities. Using linked employer-employee data for the universe of workers and firms, we show that increased product market competition, following the reform, decreased the sensitivity of pay to performance of CEOs, with no significant effects found for other managers or workers. These findings are consistent with existing theoretical results in a principal-agent framework that a fall in entry costs leads to weaker managerial incentives.
主题	International Trade and Regional Economics
关键词	Entry deregulation Product market competition Executive compensation Performance-related pay
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp10054
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538886
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	L. Alan Winters,Ana Fernandes,Priscila Ferreira. DP10054 The Effect of Competition on Managers? Compensation: Evidence From a Quasi-natural Experiment. 2014.