| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10056 |
| DP10056 Managing Intrinsic Motivation in a Long-Run Relationship | |
| Ran Spiegler; Kfir Eliaz | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-07-06 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a repeated principal-agent interaction, in which the principal offers a "spot" wage contract at every period, and the agent?s outside option follows a Markov process with i.i.d shocks. If the agent rejects an offer, the two parties are permanently separated. At any period during the relationship, the agent is productive if and only if his wage does not fall below a "reference point" (by more than an infinitesimal amount), which is defined as his lagged-expected wage in that period. We characterize the game?s unique subgame perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium path exhibits an aspect of wage rigidity. The agent?s total discounted rent is equal to the maximal shock value. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Dynamic principal agent Reference-dependence |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10056 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538888 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ran Spiegler,Kfir Eliaz. DP10056 Managing Intrinsic Motivation in a Long-Run Relationship. 2014. |
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