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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP10065 |
DP10065 A Critical Evaluation of Bail-in as a Bank Recapitalisation Mechanism | |
Charles A. E. Goodhart; Emilios Avgouleas | |
发表日期 | 2014-07-20 |
出版年 | 2014 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Many of the world?s developed economies have introduced, or are planning to introduce, bank bail-in regimes. Both the planned EU resolution regime and the European Stability Mechanism Treaty involve the participation of bank creditors in bearing the costs of bank recapitalization via the bail-in process as one of the (main) mechanisms for restoring a failing bank to health. There is a long list of actual or hypothetical advantages attached to bail-in centred bank recapitalizations. Most importantly the bail-in tool involves replacing the implicit public guarantee, on which fractional reserve banking has operated, with a system of private penalties. The bail-in tool may, indeed, be much superior in the case of idiosyncratic failure. Nonetheless, there is need for a closer examination of the bail-in process, if it is to become a successful substitute to the unpopular bailout approach. This paper discusses some of its key potential shortcomings. It explains why bail-in regimes will fail to eradicate the need for an injection of public funds where there is a threat of systemic collapse, because a number of banks have simultaneously entered into difficulties, or in the event of the failure of a large complex cross-border bank, except in those cases where failure was clearly idiosyncratic. |
主题 | International Macroeconomics |
关键词 | Bank regulation Bail-in Moral hazard Creditor flight Bank recapitalisation |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10065 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538898 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Charles A. E. Goodhart,Emilios Avgouleas. DP10065 A Critical Evaluation of Bail-in as a Bank Recapitalisation Mechanism. 2014. |
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