| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10080 |
| DP10080 Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns | |
| Andy Atkeson; Guillermo Ordoñez; Christian HELLWIG | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-07-27 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In all markets, firms go through a process of creative destruction: entry, random growth and exit. In many of these markets there are also regulations that restrict entry, possibly distorting this process. We study the public interest rationale for entry taxes in a general equilibrium model with free entry and exit of firms in which firm dynamics are driven by reputation concerns. In our model firms can produce high-quality output by making a costly but efficient initial unobservable investment. If buyers never learn about this investment, an extreme `"lemons problem" develops, no firm invests, and the market shuts down. Learning introduces reputation incentives such that a fraction of entrants do invest. We show that, if the market operates with spot prices, entry taxes always enhance the role of reputation to induce investment, improving welfare despite the impact of these taxes on equilibrium prices and total production. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Entry regulation Firm dynamics Quality investments Reputation concerns |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10080 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538913 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andy Atkeson,Guillermo Ordoñez,Christian HELLWIG. DP10080 Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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