| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP10081
|
| DP10081 Round-Robin Versus Elimination in Tournaments with a Dominant Player |
| Aner Sela; Reut Megidish
|
| 发表日期 | 2014-07-27
|
| 出版年 | 2014
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study round-robin and elimination tournaments with three players where one player is dominant, i.e., he has a higher value of winning than his weaker opponents. In every stage, a pair-wise match is modelled as an all-pay auction. We demonstrate that the expected payoff of the weak players in the round-robin tournament is higher than or equal to their expected payoffs in the elimination tournament. On the other hand, the expected payoff of the dominant player in the elimination tournament could be either higher or lower than in the round-robin tournament. We also show that if a contest designer wishes to maximize the dominant player's probability to win he should organize a round-robin tournament. However, if he wishes to maximize the players' expected total effort, then if the asymmetry between the players is relatively low, he should prefer the elimination tournament, while if the asymmetry is relatively high, he should prefer the round-robin tournament. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | All-pay auctions
Elimination tournaments
Round-robin tournaments
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10081
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538914
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Aner Sela,Reut Megidish. DP10081 Round-Robin Versus Elimination in Tournaments with a Dominant Player. 2014.
|
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