| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10084 |
| DP10084 Publish or Perish? Incentives and Careers in Italian Academia | |
| Daniele Checchi; Gianni De Fraja; Stefano Verzillo | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-07-27 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We derive a theoretical model of effort in the presence of career concern based on the multi-unit all-pay auction, and closely inspired by the Italian academic market. In this model, the number of applicants, the number of new posts, and the relative importance of the determinants of promotion determine academics' effort. Because of the specific characteristics of Italian universities, where incentives operate only through promotion, and where all appointment panels are drawn from strictly separated and relatively narrow scientific sectors, the model fits well Italian academia, and we test it in a newly constructed dataset which collects the journal publications of all Italian academics working in universities. We find that individual researchers respond to incentives in the manner predicted by the theoretical model: more capable researchers respond to increases in the importance of the measurable determinants of promotion and in the competitiveness of the scientific sector by exerting more effort; less able researchers do the opposite. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Academic job market Applied auction theory Career concerns Nepotism Publications |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10084 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538917 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniele Checchi,Gianni De Fraja,Stefano Verzillo. DP10084 Publish or Perish? Incentives and Careers in Italian Academia. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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