| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10085 |
| DP10085 Politically Sustainable Probabilistic Minority Targeting | |
| Philippe De Donder; Eugenio Peluso | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-07-27 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that a transfer targeting a minority of the population is sustained by majority voting, however small the minority targeted, when the probability to receive the transfer is decreasing and concave in income. We apply our framework to the French social housing program and obtain that empirically observed departures from these assumptions are small enough that a majority of French voters should support a positive size of this program. We also provide a sufficient condition on this probability function under which more targeting results in a lower equilibrium size of the transfer system. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Paradox of redistribution A program for the poor is a poor program Majority voting Social housing in france |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10085 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538918 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philippe De Donder,Eugenio Peluso. DP10085 Politically Sustainable Probabilistic Minority Targeting. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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