G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10093
DP10093 Distressed Acquisitions
Henri Servaes
发表日期2014-08-03
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要Firms that buy distressed and bankrupt companies or some of these companies? assets earn excess returns that are at least 1.6 percentage points higher than when they make regular acquisitions. These returns come at the expense of the target firm?s shareholders, while overall wealth gains are not affected. Returns to acquirers of distressed assets are higher when fewer large firms operate in the target firm?s industry, and when firms in the target?s industry have lower liquidity, and are financially constrained, thus limiting the number of potential buyers. They are lower when the M&A market in the target firm?s industry is more vibrant, when the target?s assets have more alternative uses, and when the economy is doing well. This evidence is consistent with the view that some firms can take advantage of fire sales by distressed and bankrupt companies needing to sell assets while restructuring.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Bankruptcy Distress Fire sales Mergers and acquisitions Restructuring
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10093
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538926
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Henri Servaes. DP10093 Distressed Acquisitions. 2014.
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