| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP10095
|
| DP10095 Staggered Contracts, Market Power, and Welfare |
| Luis Cabral
|
| 发表日期 | 2014-08-03
|
| 出版年 | 2014
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | I show that exclusive, staggered supply contracts can decrease industry competition when there are economies of scale: buyers pay a higher price to the incumbent seller and the expected value received by an entrant seller is lower when contracts are staggered. Moreover, under staggered contracts there may exist equilibria where an inefficient firm forecloses a more efficient one. Given that contracts are staggered, contract length further increases market power; however, increasing contract length may also eliminate the inefficient foreclosure equilibrium. Finally, I show that, allowing firms to choose contract structure endogenously, the resulting equilibrium path features staggered contracts. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Dynamic competition
Exclusion
Staggered contracts
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10095
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538928
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Luis Cabral. DP10095 Staggered Contracts, Market Power, and Welfare. 2014.
|
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