| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10100 |
| DP10100 Regulatory Capture by Sophistication | |
| Isabel Schnabel; Hendrik Hakenes | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-08-10 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | One explanation for the poor performance of regulation in the recent financial crisis is that regulators had been captured by the financial sector. We present a micro-founded model with rational agents in which banks capture regulators by their sophistication. Banks can search for arguments of differing complexity against tighter regulation. Finding such arguments is more difficult for weaker banks, which the regulator wants to regulate more strictly. However, the more sophisticated a bank is, the more easily it can produce arguments that a regulator does not understand. Reputational concerns prevent regulators from admitting this, hence they rubber-stamp weak banks, which leads to inefficiently low levels of regulation. Bank sophistication and reputational concerns of regulators lead to capture, and thus to worse regulatory decisions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Regulatory capture Special interests Banking regulation Sophistication Reputational concerns Financial stability Complexity |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10100 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538933 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Isabel Schnabel,Hendrik Hakenes. DP10100 Regulatory Capture by Sophistication. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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