| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10106 |
| DP10106 Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence | |
| Winand Emons | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-08-10 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature, our firms have imperfect cumulative evidence of the collusion. That is, cartel conviction is not automatic if one firm reports: reporting makes conviction only more likely, the more so, the more firms report. Furthermore, the evidence is distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of deterrence if the high-evidence firm chooses to remain silent. Minimum-evidence standards may counteract this effect. Under a marker system only one firm reports; this may increase the cost of deterrence. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Antitrust Cartels Deterrence Evidence Leniency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10106 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538939 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Winand Emons. DP10106 Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence. 2014. |
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