| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10110 |
| DP10110 Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-08-17 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government or the NGO own the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public good most should be the owner. We demonstrate the robustness of their insight when the split-the-difference rule is replaced by the deal-me-out solution. Our finding is in contrast to the private good results of Chiu (1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998), who show that the optimal ownership structure crucially depends on whether the split-the-difference rule or the deal-me-out solution is used. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bargaining Incomplete contracts Investment incentives Ownership Public goods |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10110 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538943 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP10110 Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered. 2014. |
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