G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10111
DP10111 Testing Equilibrium Multiplicity in Dynamic Games
Martin Pesendorfer; Yuya Takahashi; Taisuke Otsu
发表日期2014-08-17
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要This paper proposes several statistical tests for finite state Markov games to examine the null hypothesis that the data are generated from a single equilibrium. We formulate tests of (i) the conditional choice and state transition probabilities, (ii) the steady-state distribution, and (iii) the conditional state distribution given an initial state. In a Monte Carlo study we find that the test based on the steady-state distribution performs well and has high power even with small numbers of markets and time periods. We apply the tests to the empirical study of Ryan (2012) that analyzes dynamics of the U.S. Portland Cement industry and assess if his assumption of single equilibrium is supported by the data.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Dynamic markov game Multiplicity of equilibria Hypothesis testing
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10111
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538944
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Martin Pesendorfer,Yuya Takahashi,Taisuke Otsu. DP10111 Testing Equilibrium Multiplicity in Dynamic Games. 2014.
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