| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP10119
|
| DP10119 Governance and Comovement Under Common Ownership |
| Alex Edmans; Doron Levit
|
| 发表日期 | 2014-08-31
|
| 出版年 | 2014
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper studies the corporate governance and asset pricing implications of investors owning blocks in multiple firms. Common wisdom is that multi-firm ownership weakens governance because the blockholder is spread too thinly. We show that this need not be the case. In a single-firm benchmark, the blockholder governs through exit, selling her stake if the firm underperforms. With multiple firms, the blockholder may sell even a value-maximizing firm, to disguise her exit from another underperforming firm as being motivated by a portfolio-wide liquidity shock. This reduces the manager's effort incentives and weakens governance. On the other hand, governance can be stronger, because selling one firm and not the other is a powerful signal of underperformance. Common ownership leads to firms' stock prices being correlated, even if their fundamentals are uncorrelated. We derive empirical predictions for the direction of correlation and for whether governance is stronger or weaker with multiple firms. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Blockholders
Corporate governance
Exit
Trading
Correlation
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10119
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538952
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Alex Edmans,Doron Levit. DP10119 Governance and Comovement Under Common Ownership. 2014.
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