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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP10141 |
DP10141 Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance | |
Vicente Cunat; Maria Guadalupe; Mireia Gine | |
发表日期 | 2014-09-14 |
出版年 | 2014 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases in market value (4%) and to improvements in longterm performance: profitability and labor productivity increase, while overheads and investment fall. In contrast, we find limited effects on pay levels and structure. This suggests that SoP serves as a regular vote of confidence on the CEO, that leads to higher efficiency and market value. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Corporate governance Executive compensation Say-on-pay |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10141 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538974 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vicente Cunat,Maria Guadalupe,Mireia Gine. DP10141 Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance. 2014. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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