G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10141
DP10141 Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance
Vicente Cunat; Maria Guadalupe; Mireia Gine
发表日期2014-09-14
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases in market value (4%) and to improvements in longterm performance: profitability and labor productivity increase, while overheads and investment fall. In contrast, we find limited effects on pay levels and structure. This suggests that SoP serves as a regular vote of confidence on the CEO, that leads to higher efficiency and market value.
主题Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization
关键词Corporate governance Executive compensation Say-on-pay
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10141
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538974
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Vicente Cunat,Maria Guadalupe,Mireia Gine. DP10141 Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance. 2014.
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