| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10145 |
| DP10145 Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia | |
| Alex Edmans; Katharina A. Lewellen | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-09-21 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper links the CEO?s concerns for the current stock price to reductions in real investment. These concerns depend on the amount of equity he intends to sell in the short-term, but actual equity sales are an endogenous decision. We use the amount of stock and options scheduled to vest in a given year as an instrument for equity sales. Such vesting is determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven by current investment opportunities. An interquartile increase in instrumented equity sales is associated with a decline of 0.25% in the growth of R&D/assets, 4.6% of the average R&D/assets ratio. Vesting-induced equity sales also increase the likelihood of meeting or marginally beating analyst earnings forecasts, and are associated with higher returns to earnings announcements. More broadly, by introducing a measure of incentives that is not driven by the current contracting environment ? vesting-induced equity sales ? our paper suggests that CEO contracts affect real outcomes. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Managerial myopia Vesting Ceo incentives Short-termism |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10145 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538978 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alex Edmans,Katharina A. Lewellen. DP10145 Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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