| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10154 |
| DP10154 Channeling the Say in Political Decision Bodies | |
| Hans Gersbach; Stephan Imhof; Oriol Tejada | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-09-21 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine optimal procedures for public project provision, financing, and redistribution in democracy. We consider a large and heterogeneous decision body and show that first-best outcomes are obtained by a procedure that involves two proposal-making rounds, the right of the minority to move first, and a ban on subsidies for the agenda-setters. We explore the robustness of the result and consider applications of our rules. For instance, the result rationalizes those rules of democracies that grant minorities in the electorate or in parliament the right to initiate collective decisions on new project proposals. We further show that the above procedure constitutes the unique minimal form of political competition that ensures first-best outcomes. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Constitutional design Majority rule Public project provision Subsidies |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10154 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538987 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Stephan Imhof,Oriol Tejada. DP10154 Channeling the Say in Political Decision Bodies. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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