| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10155 |
| DP10155 Average-cost Pricing and Dynamic Selection Incentives in the Hospital Sector | |
| Luigi Siciliani | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-09-21 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This study investigates hospitals? dynamic incentives to select patients when hospitals are remunerated according to a prospective payment system of the DRG type. Given that prices typically reflect past average costs, we use a discrete-time dynamic framework. Patients differ in severity within a DRG. Providers are to some extent altruistic. For low altruism, a downward spiral of prices is possible which induces hospitals to focus on low-severity cases. For high altruism, dynamic price adjustment depends on relation between patients? severity and benefit. In a steady state, DRG prices are unlikely to give optimal incentives to treat patients. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Hospitals Drgs Selection Severity |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10155 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538988 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luigi Siciliani. DP10155 Average-cost Pricing and Dynamic Selection Incentives in the Hospital Sector. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Luigi Siciliani]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Luigi Siciliani]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Luigi Siciliani]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
