| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10173 |
| DP10173 Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information and Bid Caps | |
| Aner Sela; Ori Haimanko | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-09-28 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study two-player common-value all-pay auctions (contests) with asymmetric information under the assumption that one of the players has an information advantage over his opponent and both players are budget-constrained. We generalize the results for all-pay auctions with complete information, and show that in all-pay auctions with asymmetric information, sufficiently high (but still binding) bid caps do not change the players' expected total effort compared to the benchmark auction without any bid cap. Furthermore, we show that there are bid caps that increase the players' expected total effort compared to the benchmark. Finally, we demonstrate that there are bid caps which may have an unanticipated effect on the players' expected payoffs ? one player's information advantage may turn into a disadvantage as far as his equilibrium payoff is concerned. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric information Bid caps Common-value all-pay auctions Information advantage |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10173 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539005 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aner Sela,Ori Haimanko. DP10173 Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information and Bid Caps. 2014. |
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