G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10177
DP10177 Provider competition and over-utilization in health care
jan boone; Rudy Douven
发表日期2014-09-28
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要This paper compares the welfare effects of three ways in which health care can be organized: no competition (NC), competition for the market (CfM) and competition on the market (CoM) where the payer offers the optimal contract to providers in each case. We argue that each of these can be optimal depending on the contracting environment of a speciality. In particular, CfM is optimal in a clinical situation where the payer either has contractible information on provider quality or can enforce cost efficient protocols. If such contractible information is not available NC or CoM can be optimal depending on whether patients react to decentralized information on quality differences between providers and whether payer's and patients' preferences are aligned.
主题Industrial Organization ; Public Economics
关键词Competition Health care Selective contracting Over-utilization Mechanism design
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10177
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539009
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
jan boone,Rudy Douven. DP10177 Provider competition and over-utilization in health care. 2014.
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