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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP10177 |
DP10177 Provider competition and over-utilization in health care | |
jan boone; Rudy Douven | |
发表日期 | 2014-09-28 |
出版年 | 2014 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper compares the welfare effects of three ways in which health care can be organized: no competition (NC), competition for the market (CfM) and competition on the market (CoM) where the payer offers the optimal contract to providers in each case. We argue that each of these can be optimal depending on the contracting environment of a speciality. In particular, CfM is optimal in a clinical situation where the payer either has contractible information on provider quality or can enforce cost efficient protocols. If such contractible information is not available NC or CoM can be optimal depending on whether patients react to decentralized information on quality differences between providers and whether payer's and patients' preferences are aligned. |
主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
关键词 | Competition Health care Selective contracting Over-utilization Mechanism design |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10177 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539009 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | jan boone,Rudy Douven. DP10177 Provider competition and over-utilization in health care. 2014. |
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