| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10179 |
| DP10179 Are Donors Afraid of Charities' Core Costs? Scale Economies in Non-profit Provision | |
| Kimberley Scharf; Carlo Perroni; Ganna Pogrebna | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-10-05 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study contestability in non-profit markets where non-commercial providers supply a homogeneous collective good or service through increasing-returns-to-scale technologies. Unlike in the case of for-profit markets, in the non-profit case the absence of price-based sales contracts between providers and donors means that fixed costs are directly relevant to donors, and that they can translate into an entry barrier, protecting the position of an inefficient incumbent; or that, conversely, they can make it possible for inefficient newcomers to contest the position of a more efficient incumbent. Evidence from laboratory experiments show that fixed cost driven trade-offs between payoff dominance and perceived risk can lead to inefficient selection. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Not-for-profit organizations Entry Core funding |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10179 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539011 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kimberley Scharf,Carlo Perroni,Ganna Pogrebna. DP10179 Are Donors Afraid of Charities' Core Costs? Scale Economies in Non-profit Provision. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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