G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10179
DP10179 Are Donors Afraid of Charities' Core Costs? Scale Economies in Non-profit Provision
Kimberley Scharf; Carlo Perroni; Ganna Pogrebna
发表日期2014-10-05
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要We study contestability in non-profit markets where non-commercial providers supply a homogeneous collective good or service through increasing-returns-to-scale technologies. Unlike in the case of for-profit markets, in the non-profit case the absence of price-based sales contracts between providers and donors means that fixed costs are directly relevant to donors, and that they can translate into an entry barrier, protecting the position of an inefficient incumbent; or that, conversely, they can make it possible for inefficient newcomers to contest the position of a more efficient incumbent. Evidence from laboratory experiments show that fixed cost driven trade-offs between payoff dominance and perceived risk can lead to inefficient selection.
主题Public Economics
关键词Not-for-profit organizations Entry Core funding
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10179
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539011
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Kimberley Scharf,Carlo Perroni,Ganna Pogrebna. DP10179 Are Donors Afraid of Charities' Core Costs? Scale Economies in Non-profit Provision. 2014.
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