| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10180 |
| DP10180 The Value of Informativeness for Contracting | |
| Alex Edmans; Pierre Chaigneau | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-10-05 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The informativeness principle demonstrates qualitative benefits to increasing signal precision. However, it is difficult to quantify these benefits -- and compare them against the costs of precision -- since we typically cannot solve for the optimal contract and analyze how it changes with informativeness. We consider a standard agency model with risk-neutrality and limited liability, where the optimal contract is a call option. The direct effect of reducing signal volatility is a fall in the value of the option, benefiting the principal. The indirect effect is a change in the agent's effort incentives. If the original option is sufficiently out-of-the-money, the agent can only beat the strike price if he exerts effort and there is a high noise realization. Thus, a fall in volatility reduces effort incentives. As the agency problem weakens, the gains from precision fall towards zero, potentially justifying pay-for-luck. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Contract theory Informativeness principle Limited liability Options Pay-for-luck Relative performance evaluation Principal-agent model |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10180 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539012 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alex Edmans,Pierre Chaigneau. DP10180 The Value of Informativeness for Contracting. 2014. |
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