全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP10185 Corporate Governance and Bank Insolvency Risk: International Evidence

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP10185
	DP10185 Corporate Governance and Bank Insolvency Risk: International Evidence
	Harry Huizinga; Asli Demirgüç-Kunt; Kebin Ma; Deniz Anginer
发表日期	2014-10-05
出版年	2014
语种	英语
摘要	This paper finds that shareholder-friendly corporate governance is positively associated with bank insolvency risk, as proxied by the Z-score and the Merton?s distance to default measure, for an international sample of banks over the 2004-2008 period. Banks are special in that ?good? corporate governance increases bank insolvency risk relatively more for banks that are large and located in countries with sound public finances, as banks aim to exploit the financial safety net. ?Good? corporate governance is specifically associated with higher asset volatility, more non-performing loans, and a lower tangible capital ratio. Furthermore, ?good? corporate governance is associated with more bank risk taking at times of rapid economic expansion. Consistent with increased risk-taking, ?good? corporate governance is associated with a higher valuation of the implicit insurance provided by the financial safety net, especially in the case of large banks. These results underline the importance of the financial safety net and too-big-to-fail policies in encouraging excessive risk-taking by banks.
主题	International Macroeconomics
关键词	Capitalization Non-performing loans Corporate governance Bank insolvency
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp10185
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539017
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Harry Huizinga,Asli Demirgüç-Kunt,Kebin Ma,et al. DP10185 Corporate Governance and Bank Insolvency Risk: International Evidence. 2014.