| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10199 |
| DP10199 Basic versus supplementary health insurance: moral hazard and adverse selection | |
| jan boone | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-10-12 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on the private supplementary insurance market. Surprisingly, the cost effectiveness of a treatment does not affect its priority to be covered by basic insurance. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Adverse selection Cost effectiveness Moral hazard Public vs private insurance Universal basic health insurance Voluntary supplementary insurance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10199 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539032 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | jan boone. DP10199 Basic versus supplementary health insurance: moral hazard and adverse selection. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [jan boone]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [jan boone]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [jan boone]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
