| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10207 |
| DP10207 Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-10-19 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations. We explore the implications of such transaction costs. Prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned: A party may have stronger investment incentives when a non-investing party is the owner, and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership structure. Intuitively, an ownership structure that is unattractive in the standard model may now be desirable, because it implies large gains from trade, such that the parties are more inclined to incur the transaction costs. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Incomplete contracts Property rights approach Vertical integration Joint ownership Transaction costs |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10207 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539040 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP10207 Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm. 2014. |
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