| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10215 |
| DP10215 Unintended Effects of Anonymous Resumes | |
| Bruno Crépon; Luc Behaghel; Thomas Le Barbanchon | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-10-19 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized resumes for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous resumes or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous resumes. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Anonymous applications Discrimination Randomized experiments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10215 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539048 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bruno Crépon,Luc Behaghel,Thomas Le Barbanchon. DP10215 Unintended Effects of Anonymous Resumes. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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