G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10215
DP10215 Unintended Effects of Anonymous Resumes
Bruno Crépon; Luc Behaghel; Thomas Le Barbanchon
发表日期2014-10-19
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized resumes for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous resumes or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous resumes. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority.
主题Labour Economics
关键词Anonymous applications Discrimination Randomized experiments
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10215
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539048
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Bruno Crépon,Luc Behaghel,Thomas Le Barbanchon. DP10215 Unintended Effects of Anonymous Resumes. 2014.
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