| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10217 |
| DP10217 Incentive Pay and Bank Risk-Taking:Evidence from Austrian, German, and Swiss Banks | |
| Harald Hau; Johannes Steinbrecher; Matthias Efing | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-10-26 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We use payroll data on 1.2 million bank employee years in the Austrian, German, and Swiss banking sector to identify incentive pay in the critical banking segments of treasury/capital market management and investment banking for 66 banks. We document an economically significant correlation of incentive pay with both the level and volatility of bank trading income particularly for the pre-crisis period 2003-7 for which incentive pay was strongest. This result is robust if we instrument the bonus share in the capital markets divisions with the strength of incentive pay in unrelated bank divisions like retail banking. Moreover, pre-crisis incentive pay appears too strong for an optimal trade-off between trading income and risk which maximizes the NPV of trading income. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Trading income Bank risk Incentive pay Bonus payments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10217 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539050 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Harald Hau,Johannes Steinbrecher,Matthias Efing. DP10217 Incentive Pay and Bank Risk-Taking:Evidence from Austrian, German, and Swiss Banks. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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