| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
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| 来源ID | DP10223
|
| DP10223 Central Banks: Powerful, Political and Unaccountable? |
| Willem Buiter
|
| 发表日期 | 2014-10-26
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| 出版年 | 2014
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Central banks? economic and political importance has grown in advanced economies since the start of the Great Financial Crisis in 2007. An unwillingness or inability of governments to use countercyclical fiscal policy has made monetary policy the only stabilization tool in town. However, much of the enhanced significance of central banks is due to their lender-of-last-resort and market-maker-of-last-resort roles, providing liquidity to financially distressed and illiquid financial institutions and sovereigns. Supervisory and regulatory functions ? often deeply political, have been heaped on central banks. Central bankers also increasingly throw their weight around in the public discussion of and even the design and implementation of fiscal policy and structural reforms - areas which are way beyond their mandates and competence.
In this lecture I argue that the preservation of the central bank?s legitimacy requires that a clear line be drawn between the central bank?s provision of liquidity and the Treasury?s solvency support for systemically important financial institutions. All activities of the central bank that expose it to material credit risk should be guaranteed by the Treasury. In addition, central banks must become more accountable by increasing the transparency of their lender-of-last-resort and marketmaker-of-last resort activities. Central banks ought not to engage in quasi-fiscal activities. Finally, central banks should stick to their knitting and central bankers should not become participants in public debates and deeply political arguments about matters beyond their mandate and competence, including fiscal policy and structural reform. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics
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| 关键词 | Seigniorage
Quasi-fiscal
Independence
Legitimacy
Accountability
monetary policy
Regulation
supervision
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| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10223
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| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539056
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Willem Buiter. DP10223 Central Banks: Powerful, Political and Unaccountable?. 2014.
|
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