G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10267
DP10267 Human Capital and Optimal Redistribution
Winfried Koeniger; Julien Prat
发表日期2014-11-30
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要We characterize optimal redistribution in a dynastic economy with observable human capital and hidden ability. The government can use education to improve the insurance-incentive trade-off because there is a wedge between human capital investment in the laissez faire and the social optimum. This wedge differs from the wedge for bequests because: (i) returns to human capital are risky; (ii) human capital may change informational rents. We illustrate numerically that, if ability is i.i.d. across generations, human capital investment declines in parents? income in the social optimum, and show how this optimum can be implemented with student loans or means-tested grants.
主题Labour Economics ; Public Economics
关键词Intergenerational equity Human capital Optimal taxation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10267
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539100
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Winfried Koeniger,Julien Prat. DP10267 Human Capital and Optimal Redistribution. 2014.
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