| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10274 |
| DP10274 First-Mover Advantage in Round-Robin Tournaments | |
| Aner Sela; Reut Megidish | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-11-30 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study round-robin tournaments with one prize and four symmetric players. There are three rounds, each of which includes two sequential matches where each player plays against a different opponent in every round. Each pair-wise match is modelled as an all-pay auction. We characterize the sub-game perfect equilibrium and show that a player who plays in the first match of each of the first two rounds has a first-mover advantage as reflected by a significantly higher winning probability as well as a significantly higher expected payoff than his opponents. Therefore, if the contest designer wishes to sustain the fair play principle he has to schedule all the matches in each round at the same time in order to obstruct a meaningful advantage to one of the players. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | All-pay contests Round-robin tournaments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10274 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539106 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aner Sela,Reut Megidish. DP10274 First-Mover Advantage in Round-Robin Tournaments. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Aner Sela]的文章 |
| [Reut Megidish]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Aner Sela]的文章 |
| [Reut Megidish]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Aner Sela]的文章 |
| [Reut Megidish]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
