| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10284 |
| DP10284 Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation | |
| Klaus Schmidt; Fabian Herweg | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-12-07 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and if the buyer's bargaining position is sufficiently strong. Moreover, we show that negotiations provide stronger incentives for sellers to investigate possible design improvements than auctions. This provides an explanation for the widespread use of negotiations as a procurement mechanism in private industry. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Auctions Negotiations Procurement Renegotiations Adaptation costs Loss aversion Behavioral contract theory |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10284 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539116 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Klaus Schmidt,Fabian Herweg. DP10284 Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation. 2014. |
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