| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10311 |
| DP10311 Bailouts And Moral Hazard: How Implicit Government Guarantees Affect Financial Stability | |
| Ouarda Merrouche; Mike Mariathasan | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-12-21 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The recent crisis has shown that banks in distress can often expect to benefit from (implicit) government guarantees. This paper analyzes a panel of 781 banks from 90 countries to test whether the expectation of individual and systemic government support induces moral hazard. It shows that banks tend to be more leveraged, funded with capital of lower quality, more heavily invested in risky assets and exposed to more severe liquidity mismatch when they themselves -but also when their competitors- are perceived as being more likely to benefit from government support. We show that the default of Lehman Brothers in 2008 reduced moral hazard in the short-run, but not in the long-run, as the systemic consequences of Lehman?s failure became apparent. In addition, our large country coverage allows us to provide new results on policies, institutions, and regulations that can be put in place to reduce moral hazard induced by implicit guarantees to the banking sector. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Banking Moral hazard Government guarantees Bailout |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10311 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539143 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ouarda Merrouche,Mike Mariathasan. DP10311 Bailouts And Moral Hazard: How Implicit Government Guarantees Affect Financial Stability. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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