| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10312 |
| DP10312 Managerial Incentive Problems and Return Distributions | |
| Dezso Szalay | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-12-21 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a model of managerial incentive problems where a manager chooses the first two moments of his firm's profit distribution - mean and volatility - along an efficient frontier. Assuming that managers differ with respect to their marginal cost of effort and their risk aversion we explore our model's comparative statics predictions in full detail. If managers' preference parameters are commonly known and associated, then a positive correlation between expected returns, volatility of profits, and incentives is the natural outcome. Allowing in addition for adverse selection with respect to the managers' preference parameters does not change the predicted correlation if the variation in observed contracts is not too large. Moreover, observed incentive schemes reflect exclusion of some manager types. Neglecting the endogeneity of risk in empirical studies biases estimates towards zero. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Managerial incentive problems Multidimensional heterogeneity Multidimensional screening |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10312 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539144 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dezso Szalay. DP10312 Managerial Incentive Problems and Return Distributions. 2014. |
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