| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10337 |
| DP10337 College Diversity and Investment Incentives | |
| Andrew Newman; Thomas Gall | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-01-11 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the aggregate economic effects of diversity policies such as affirmative action in college admission. If agents are constrained in the side payments they can make, the free market allocation displays excessive segregation relative to the first-best. Affirmative action policies can restore diversity within colleges but also affect incentives to invest in pre-college scholastic achievement. Affirmative action policies that are achievement-based can increase aggregate investment and income, reduce inequality, and increase aggregate welfare relative to the free market outcome. They may also be more effective than decentralized policies such as cross-subsidization of students by colleges. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Affirmative action Education Matching Misallocation Multidimensional attributes Nontransferable utility Segregation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10337 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539168 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Newman,Thomas Gall. DP10337 College Diversity and Investment Incentives. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Andrew Newman]的文章 |
| [Thomas Gall]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Andrew Newman]的文章 |
| [Thomas Gall]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Andrew Newman]的文章 |
| [Thomas Gall]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
