| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP10340
|
| DP10340 Sequential Auctions with Capacity Constraints: an Experimental Investigation |
| Juan Carrillo; Isabelle Brocas
|
| 发表日期 | 2015-01-11
|
| 出版年 | 2015
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We conduct a laboratory experiment where groups of 4 subjects constrained to obtain at most one good each, sequentially bid for 3 goods in first and second price auctions. Subjects learn at the beginning of each auction their valuation for the good and exit the auction once they have obtained one good. We show that, contrary to equilibrium predictions, subjects? bidding behavior is excessively similar across units and across mechanisms at the aggregate level. We provide two (complementary) explanations for these departures. One is bounded rationality. Subjects do not fully comprehend subtle differences between mechanisms. The other is self-selection. Subjects are very heterogeneous and some of them deviate more from equilibrium than others. Since deviations take mostly the form of overbidding, these subjects win the first or second good and exit the auction, leaving those who play closer to theoretical predictions to bid for the third good. Support for this hypothesis comes from the documented higher bidding, lower efficiency and lower profits associated with the first and second unit compared to the third one. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Auctions
Laboratory experiment
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10340
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539171
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Juan Carrillo,Isabelle Brocas. DP10340 Sequential Auctions with Capacity Constraints: an Experimental Investigation. 2015.
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