| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10343 |
| DP10343 Optimal Patronage | |
| Mikhail Drugov | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-01-11 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the design of promotions in an organization where agents belong to groups that advance their cause. Examples and applications include political groups, ethnicities, agents motivated by the work in the public sector and corruption. In an overlapping generations model, juniors compete for promotions. Seniors have two kinds of discretion: direct discretion which allows an immediate advancement of their cause and promotion discretion ("patronage") which allows a biasing of the promotion decision in favour of the juniors from their group. We consider two possible goals of the principal, maximizing juniors' efforts and affecting the steady-state composition of the senior level towards the preferred group, and show that patronage may be strictly positive in both of them. We also apply the second setting to the case of corruption. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Bureaucracy Contest Corruption Motivated agents Patronage Promotion |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10343 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539174 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mikhail Drugov. DP10343 Optimal Patronage. 2015. |
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