| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10363 |
| DP10363 A Structural Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs | |
| Alessandro Gavazza; Manolis Galenianos | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-01-25 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We estimate a model of illicit drugs markets using data on purchases of crack cocaine. Buyers are searching for high-quality drugs, but they determine drugs? quality (i.e., their purity) only after consuming them. Hence, sellers can rip off first-time buyers or can offer higher-quality drugs to induce buyers to purchase from them again. In equilibrium, a distribution of qualities persists. The estimated model implies that sellers? moral hazard reduces the average purity of drugs by approximately 20 percent and increases its dispersion more than fourfold. Moreover, increasing penalties may increase the purity and affordability of the drugs traded because doing so increases sellers? relative profitability of targeting loyal buyers versus first-time buyers. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Drugs Moral hazard Product quality Search |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10363 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539194 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandro Gavazza,Manolis Galenianos. DP10363 A Structural Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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