| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10367 |
| DP10367 Taking the Lord's Name in Vain: The Impact of Connected Directors on 19th century British Banks | |
| Richard Grossman; Masami Imai | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-01-25 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper utilizes data on the presence of prominent individuals?that is, those with political (e.g., Members of Parliament) and aristocratic titles (e.g., lords)--on the boards of directors of English and Welsh banks from 1879-1909 to investigate whether the appointment of well-connected directors enhanced equity value for bank shareholders. Our analysis of panel data shows that the appointment of connected directors did not increase the rate of return on bank equity. In fact, we find that the appointment of MPs to directorships had negative effects on bank equity returns. Our event-study analysis corroborates this finding, showing that a bank?s shares exhibited negative abnormal returns when their directors were elected to Parliament. Taken together, our results indicate that connected directors yielded little--or even negative--economic payoff to bank shareholders in pre-war Britain. |
| 主题 | Economic History ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Banks Capital markets Corporate governance Economic history Private finance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10367 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539198 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard Grossman,Masami Imai. DP10367 Taking the Lord's Name in Vain: The Impact of Connected Directors on 19th century British Banks. 2015. |
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