| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10372 |
| DP10372 Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion | |
| Torsten Persson; Tim Besley; Anders Jensen | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-01-25 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies individual and social motives in tax evasion. We build a simple dynamic model that incorporates these motives and their interaction. The social motives underpin the role of norms and is the source of the dynamics that we study. Our empirical analysis exploits the adoption in 1990 of a poll tax to fund local government in the UK, which led to widespread evasion. We also exploit a series of natural experiments due to narrow election outcomes, which induce shifts into single-majority local governments and lead to more vigorous enforcement of local taxes. The econometric results are consistent with the model?s main predictions on the dynamics of evasion. ?A widespread view among tax scholars holds that law enforcement does not explain why people pay taxes. The penalty for ordinary tax convictions is small; the probability of detection is trivial; so the expected sanction is small. Yet large numbers of Americans pay their taxes. ... Some scholars therefore conclude that the explanation for the tendency to pay taxes must be that people are obeying a norm ? presumably a norm of tax payment or a more general norm of law-abiding behavior.? Posner (2000, page 1782) |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Social norms Tax evasion Poll tax |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10372 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539203 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Torsten Persson,Tim Besley,Anders Jensen. DP10372 Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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