| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10377 |
| DP10377 Second-price common value auctions with uncertainty, private and public information: experimental evidence | |
| Juan Carrillo; Isabelle Brocas; Manuel Castro | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We conduct a laboratory experiment of second-price sealed bid auctions of a common value good with two bidders. Bidders face three different types of information: common uncertainty (unknown information), private information (known by one bidder) and public information (known by both bidders), and auctions differ on the relative importance of these three types of information. We find that subjects differentiate insufficiently between private and public information and deviate from the theoretical predictions with respect to all three types of information. There is under-reaction to both private and public information and systematic overbidding in all auctions above and beyond the standard winner's curse. The Cursed Equilibrium and Level-k models successfully account for some features of the data but others remain unexplained. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Cursed equilibrium Laboratory experiments Level-k Second price common value auctions Winner's curse |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10377 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539208 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Juan Carrillo,Isabelle Brocas,Manuel Castro. DP10377 Second-price common value auctions with uncertainty, private and public information: experimental evidence. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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