| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10381 |
| DP10381 Health provider networks, quality and costs | |
| jan boone; Christoph Schottmüller | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We provide a modeling framework to think about selective contracting in the health care sector. Two health care providers differ in quality and costs. When buying health insurance, consumers observe neither provider quality nor costs. We derive an equilibrium where health insurers signal provider quality through their choice of provider network. Selective contracting focuses on low cost providers. Contracting both providers signals high quality. Market power tends to lower quality and lead to inefficiency. In a dynamic extension of the model, providers under-invest in quality while there can be both over and under-investment in cost reductions if there is a monopoly insurer while an efficient investment equilibrium exists with insurer competition. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Exclusive contracts Health care quality Managed care Selective contracting Signaling Common contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10381 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539212 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | jan boone,Christoph Schottmüller. DP10381 Health provider networks, quality and costs. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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