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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP10392 |
DP10392 Stock Market Returns, Corporate Governance and Capital Market Equilibrium | |
Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden; Bruno Parigi | |
发表日期 | 2015-02-08 |
出版年 | 2015 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper analyzes why corporate governance matters for stock returns if the stock market prices the underlying managerial agency problem correctly. Our theory assumes that strict corporate governance prevents managers from diverting cash flows, but reduces incentives for managerial effort. In capital market equilibrium, this trade-off has implications for the firm's earnings, stock returns, and managerial ownership, because governance impacts the firm's risk-return structure. In particular, the strictness of corporate governance is negatively related to earnings and positively to ß;. Various empirical tests with U.S. data using the governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) yield results consistent with these predictions. |
主题 | Financial Economics |
关键词 | Beta Capm Cash flow Corporate governance Stock returns |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10392 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539223 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden,Bruno Parigi. DP10392 Stock Market Returns, Corporate Governance and Capital Market Equilibrium. 2015. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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