G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10400
DP10400 Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms
Paolo Fulghieri; David Dicks
发表日期2015-02-08
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要We present a novel source of disagreement grounded in decision theory: ambiguity aversion. We show that ambiguity aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm's insider and outside shareholders, creating a new rationale for corporate governance systems. In our paper, optimal corporate governance depends on both firm characteristics and the composition of the outsiders' overall portfolio. A strong governance system is desirable when the value of the firm's assets in place, relative to the growth opportunity, is sufficiently small or is sufficiently large, suggesting a corporate governance life cycle. In addition, more diversified outsiders (such as generalist mutual funds) prefer stronger governance, while outsiders with a portfolio heavily invested in the same asset class as the firm (such as venture capitalists or private equity investors) are more willing to tolerate a weak governance system, where the portfolio companies' insiders have more leeway in determining corporate policies. Finally, we find that ambiguity aversion introduces a direct link between the strength of the corporate governance system and firm transparency, whereby firms with weaker governance should also optimally be more opaque.
主题Financial Economics
关键词ambiguity aversion Corporate governance Disagreement
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10400
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539231
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Paolo Fulghieri,David Dicks. DP10400 Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms. 2015.
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