| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP10400
|
| DP10400 Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms |
| Paolo Fulghieri; David Dicks
|
| 发表日期 | 2015-02-08
|
| 出版年 | 2015
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We present a novel source of disagreement grounded in decision theory: ambiguity aversion. We show that ambiguity aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm's insider and outside shareholders, creating a new rationale for corporate governance systems. In our paper, optimal corporate governance depends on both firm characteristics and the composition of the outsiders' overall portfolio. A strong governance system is desirable when the value of the firm's assets in place, relative to the growth opportunity, is sufficiently small or is sufficiently large, suggesting a corporate governance life cycle. In addition, more diversified outsiders (such as generalist mutual funds) prefer stronger governance, while outsiders with a portfolio heavily invested in the same asset class as the firm (such as venture capitalists or private equity investors) are more willing to tolerate a weak governance system, where the portfolio companies' insiders have more leeway in determining corporate policies. Finally, we find that ambiguity aversion introduces a direct link between the strength of the corporate governance system and firm transparency, whereby firms with weaker governance should also optimally be more opaque. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | ambiguity aversion
Corporate governance
Disagreement
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10400
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539231
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Paolo Fulghieri,David Dicks. DP10400 Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms. 2015.
|
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