| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10407 |
| DP10407 Intergovernmental Grants as Signals and the Alignment Effect: Theory and Evidence | |
| Ben Lockwood; Michela Redoano; Francesco Porcelli | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-02-08 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper provides a simple political agency model to explain the effect of political alignment between different tiers of government on intergovernmental grants and election outcomes. Key features of the model are: (i) rational voters interpret public good provision as a signal of incumbent competence, and (ii) realistically, grants are unobservable to voters. In this setting, the national government will use the grant as an instrument to manipulate the public good signal for the benefit of aligned local incumbents and challengers. Then, aligned municipalities receive more grants, with this effect being stronger before elections, and the probability that the aligned local incumbent is re-elected is higher. These predictions are tested using a regression discontinuity design on a new data-set on Italian municipalities. At a second empirical stage, the national grant to municipalities is instrumented with an alignment indicator, allowing estimation of a flypaper effect for Italian municipalities. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Fiscal federalism Political competition Accountability Flypaper effect |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10407 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539238 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ben Lockwood,Michela Redoano,Francesco Porcelli. DP10407 Intergovernmental Grants as Signals and the Alignment Effect: Theory and Evidence. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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