Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP10408 |
DP10408 Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power | |
Laurent Bouton; Aniol Llorente-Saguer; Frederic Malherbe | |
发表日期 | 2015-02-08 |
出版年 | 2015 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Consider a group of agents whose goal is to reform the status quo if and only if this is Pareto improving. Agents have private information and may have common or private objectives, which creates a tension between information aggregation and minority protection. We propose a simple voting system -majority rule with veto power- that essentially resolves this tension, for it combines the advantageous properties of both majority and unanimity rules. We argue that our results shed new light on the evolution of voting rules in EU institutions and could guide policy reforms in cases such as juries in the US. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Pareto criterion Unanimity rule Veto power Information aggregation Constructive abstention |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10408 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539239 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Laurent Bouton,Aniol Llorente-Saguer,Frederic Malherbe. DP10408 Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power. 2015. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。