G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10408
DP10408 Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power
Laurent Bouton; Aniol Llorente-Saguer; Frederic Malherbe
发表日期2015-02-08
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要Consider a group of agents whose goal is to reform the status quo if and only if this is Pareto improving. Agents have private information and may have common or private objectives, which creates a tension between information aggregation and minority protection. We propose a simple voting system -majority rule with veto power- that essentially resolves this tension, for it combines the advantageous properties of both majority and unanimity rules. We argue that our results shed new light on the evolution of voting rules in EU institutions and could guide policy reforms in cases such as juries in the US.
主题Public Economics
关键词Pareto criterion Unanimity rule Veto power Information aggregation Constructive abstention
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10408
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539239
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Laurent Bouton,Aniol Llorente-Saguer,Frederic Malherbe. DP10408 Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power. 2015.
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