| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10327 |
| DP10327 Bargaining under the Illusion of Transparency | |
| Kristóf Madarász | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-02-15 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An uninformed seller offers an object to a privately informed buyer. The buyer projects information and exaggerates the probability that the seller is informed. Letting the buyer bargain and name her own price raises the seller's payoff above the full-commitment payoff. Under seller-offer bargaining, any positive degree of projection implies a full reversal of the Coasian result in stationary strategies. As delay between offers decreases, the seller raises his initial price and, in the limit, extracts the full surplus from trade. Dynamic bargaining without price-commitment is revenue-optimal. Existing experimental evidence is consistent with the comparative static predictions of the model. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bargaining Coase conjecture. Information projection Pricing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10327 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539243 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kristóf Madarász. DP10327 Bargaining under the Illusion of Transparency. 2015. |
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