| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10418 |
| DP10418 Capital Taxation under Political Constraints | |
| Florian Scheuer | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-02-15 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies optimal dynamic tax policy under the threat of political reform. A policy will be reformed ex post if a large enough political coalition supports reform; thus, sustainable policies are those that will continue to attract enough political support in the future. We find that optimal marginal capital taxes are either progressive or U-shaped, so that savings are subsidized for the poor and/or the middle class but are taxed for the rich. U-shaped capital taxes always emerge when the salient reform threat consists of radically redistributing capital and individuals' political behavior is purely determined by economic motives. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Coalition formation Inequality Tax reforms Wealth taxation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10418 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539250 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Florian Scheuer. DP10418 Capital Taxation under Political Constraints. 2015. |
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